Airport security? A complete joke. This has been apparent for some time, of course, but all the "security theatre" nonsense at least makes it seem as though something is being done. And that is the important thing, isn't it? The Atlantic's Jeffrey Goldberg has a good piece demonstrating just how pointless the mania for "security" is. No chance of a return to sanity of course. That would mean the terrorists are winning.
Anyway, Goldberg successfully passes through the security checkpoints using a fake boarding pass:
We were in the clear. But what did we prove?
“We proved that the ID triangle is hopeless,” Schneier said.
The ID triangle: before a passenger boards a commercial flight, he
interacts with his airline or the government three times—when he
purchases his ticket; when he passes through airport security; and
finally at the gate, when he presents his boarding pass to an airline
agent. It is at the first point of contact, when the ticket is
purchased, that a passenger’s name is checked against the government’s
no-fly list. It is not checked again, and for this reason, Schneier
argued, the process is merely another form of security theater.
“The goal is to make sure that this ID triangle represents one
person,” he explained. “Here’s how you get around it. Let’s assume
you’re a terrorist and you believe your name is on the watch list.”
It’s easy for a terrorist to check whether the government has cottoned
on to his existence, Schneier said; he simply has to submit his name
online to the new, privately run CLEAR
program, which is meant to fast-pass approved travelers through
security. If the terrorist is rejected, then he knows he’s on the watch
list.
To slip through the only check against the no-fly list, the
terrorist uses a stolen credit card to buy a ticket under a fake name.
“Then you print a fake boarding pass with your real name on it and go
to the airport. You give your real ID, and the fake boarding pass with
your real name on it, to security. They’re checking the documents
against each other. They’re not checking your name against the no-fly
list—that was done on the airline’s computers. Once you’re through
security, you rip up the fake boarding pass, and use the real boarding
pass that has the name from the stolen credit card. Then you board the
plane, because they’re not checking your name against your ID at
boarding.”
What if you don’t know how to steal a credit card?
“Then you’re a stupid terrorist and the government will catch you,” he said.
What if you don’t know how to download a PDF of an actual boarding pass and alter it on a home computer?
“Then you’re a stupid terrorist and the government will catch you.”
I couldn’t believe that what Schneier was saying was true—in the
national debate over the no-fly list, it is seldom, if ever, mentioned
that the no-fly list doesn’t work. “It’s true,” he said.
Whose interests are served by the security-mania? Not the public's for sure. The only winners are bureaucrats and, in some sense, the terrorists themselves. Clearly this means it's an indispensable sham.
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